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Abstract
A constrained informationally efficient market is defined to be one whose price pro-
cess arises as the outcome of some equilibrium where agents face restrictions on trade.
This paper investigates the case of short sale constraints, a setting which despite its
simplicity, generates new insights. In particular, it is shown that short sale constrained
informationally efficient markets always admit equivalent supermartingale measures
and local martingale deflators, but not necessarily local martingale measures. And if
in addition some local martingale deflator turns the price process into a true martin-
gale, then the market is constrained informationally efficient. Examples are given to
illustrate the subtle phenomena that can arise in the presence of short sale constraints,
with particular attention to representative agent equilibria and the different notions of
no arbitrage.
KEY WORDS: informational efficiency, short sales, no arbitrage, no dominance,
equilibrium, representative agents, martingales measures, local martingales, super-
martingales, local martingale deflators.
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1 Introduction
Since Fama [11] published his seminal paper on market efficiency four decades ago, a vast
body of empirical research has emerged evaluating the informational efficiency of real-world
markets with mixed results. These mixed results are partly due to the the notorious joint
model hypothesis problem—to test for informational efficiency one must jointly hypothesize
an equilibrium model. Competing theories to the rational competitive markets paradigm
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have also been proposed to reconcile this conflicting evidence such as the behavioral approach
to finance and economics (excellent surveys include Hirshleifer [15], Shleifer [36], Barberis
and Thaler [1]) and the adaptive market hypothesis (see, for instance, Lo [28]). In all cases,
informational efficiency, i.e. the degree to which information about fundamentals is quickly
and accurately reflected in asset prices, has proved to be an immensely powerful tool for
understanding the behavior of asset markets.
To circumvent this joint model hypothesis, Jarrow and Larsson [17] formalized the defi-
nition of informational efficiency, consistent with Fama’s original ideas, as the existence of
some equilibrium supporting the given asset price process. In a continuous-time setting, the
notion of no arbitrage unfortunately becomes very delicate (see Harrison and Kreps[14], Del-
bean and Schachermayer [9, 10]) so one might expect the same to be true for the existence
of a supporting equilibrium. However, following earlier work in this direction (Harrison and
Kreps [14], Kreps [26], Ross [35]) in [17] a surprisingly simple answer is given: an equilib-
rium supporting a given price process exists if and only if the price process satisfies the No
Free Lunch with Vanishing Risk (NFLVR) property of Delbaen and Schachermayer, as well
as Merton’s No Dominance (ND) condition [30], see also Jarrow, Protter, Shimbo [18, 19].
A key implication of this characterization is that informational efficiency can be rejected
without committing to any particular equilibrium model by merely proving the existence
of arbitrage opportunities and/or dominated strategies. At least for rejecting informational
efficiency, this circumvents the joint model hypothesis problem.
For accepting informational efficiency, however, exhausting all possible arbitrage oppor-
tunities and/or dominated strategies is not practical. A second characterization of informa-
tional efficiency also proven in [17] can be used in this regard. It is shown that a supporting
equilibrium exists if and only if an equivalent probability measure exists such that the price
process, normalized by the money market account’s value, is a martingale. This is called
an equivalent martingale measure. With this characterization, informational efficiency can
be accepted using a conditional joint model hypothesis. Indeed, one first assumes a partic-
ular stochastic process for the asset’s price evolution. Then, this evolution is empirically
validated/rejected. If this evolution is validated, then the stochastic processes’ parame-
ters are checked for consistency with the existence of an equivalent martingale measure. If
consistent, then informational efficiency is accepted. In contrast to the joint model hypoth-
esis, this approach has the advantage that the assumed evolution can be validated/rejected
independently of informational efficiency.
A crucial assumption in the above formulation is that markets are frictionless, i.e. there
are no transaction costs and trading is unrestricted. When this assumption provides a
reasonable approximation, the above methodology is appropriate for tesing informational
efficiency. Yet, not for all markets and not for a given market at all times is trading unre-
stricted. Indeed, in most emerging markets short selling is impossible or not allowed (see
Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu [5]), and during the recent financial crisis regulators in well de-
veloped markets prohibited short sales to halt declining prices (see Beber and Pagano [3],
Boehmer, Jones and Zhang [4]). When trading is constrained, using the above methodology
to test for informational efficiency may lead to false rejections. The rejection being due to
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the existence of trading constraints and not market inefficiency.
The purpose of the present paper is to extend the model in [17] to include trading con-
straints, more specifically short sale constraints. We now define a constrained informationally
efficient market as one where there exists an equilibrium with agents facing short sale con-
straints that supports the given price process. This seemingly modest alteration brings new
insights and subtleties in the characterization of an informationally efficient market.
Our first main result, Theorem 3.1, shows that constrained informational efficiency im-
plies the existence of a local martingale deflator, turning asset prices into local martingales.
This may come as a surprise since, due to the short sale constraint, only supermartingale
deflators should be guaranteed. The key insight here is that market clearing always results in
some agent being locally unconstrained, and this suffices to yield a local martingale deflator.
It is well-known that the existence of a local martingale deflator does not rule out uncon-
strained arbitrage. Nonetheless, the above intuition regarding the role of market clearing
suggests that unconstrained arbitrage strategies are also impossible in equilibrium—indeed,
if such a strategy were to exist, an investor with strictly positive holdings could add “a little
bit” of it, and thus do better without violating the short sale constraint. However, this rea-
soning fails. In Section 5.2 we give an example of an equilibrium with a single representative
agent with logarithmic utility, optimally holding the full supply of the risky asset, but where
arbitrage using unconstrained strategies is nonetheless possible (i.e., the condition NA fails.)
Less surprisingly, we find that constrained informational efficiency always implies a con-
strained version of NFLVR. However, the situation regarding ND is less clear. We show that
a constrained version of ND holds whenever a representative agent equilibrium exists, but
beyond that not much can be said. In fact, our strongest results are obtained in the setting
of constrained representative agent equilibria. This situation is addressed by our second
main result, Theorem 4.1, which shows that a given price process is supported by some such
equilibrium if and only if, in addition to the above conditions, there is a local martingale
deflator that turns the price process into a true martingale. Moreover, in a multi-agent com-
plete market equilibrium, these conditions will be satisfied whenever all agents have strictly
positive holdings in the risky asset, see Proposition 4.1. Finally, if a given equilibrium yields
a price process that could, theoretically, be supported by some representative agent equi-
librium, it is of interest to know more about this representative agent. In Theorem 4.2 we
show that the representative agent can always be constructed by aggregating the individual
agent utilities using the well-known procedure pioneered in Negishi [32].
With respect to a set of necessary and then sufficient conditions useful for testing con-
strained informational efficiency, our insights can be summarized as follows. A constrained
informationally efficient market implies both No Unbounded Profit with Bounded Risk
(NUPBR) and constrained NFLVR. If one can discover trading strategies violating either
condition, then constrained informational efficiency can be rejected without the joint model
hypothesis problem. In the converse direction, if there exists an equivalent supermartingale
measure and a local martingale deflator that turns the price process into a martingale, then
the market is constrained informationally efficient. In principle, this sufficient condition can
be used, in conjunction with a validated price process, to accept an informationally efficient
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market. Testing for constrained informational efficiency using these new insights awaits
subsequent research.
An outline for this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the pricing model and reviews
the relevant no-arbitrage type conditions and their characterizations. Section 3 introduces
the agents and the notion of equilibrium and constrained informational efficiency. Necessary
conditions for efficiency are discussed. Section 4 deals with representative agent equilibria,
and a characterization theorem is given. Aggregation of individual utilities is considered.
Section 5 contains examples illustrating to what extent our results are sharp. Section 6
concludes and lists some open questions suggested by our analysis.
2 The Model
We consider a continuous time and continuous trading economy on a finite horizon. There
are a finite number of agents in the economy, trading in a competitive market with no
transaction costs. The market is constrained in that there are no short sales allowed for risky
assets. Otherwise, it is assumed to be a frictionless market. We are given a complete filtered
probability space (Ω,F ,F,P), where the filtration F = (Ft)0≤t≤T , defined on a bounded
time interval [0, T ], satisfies the usual hypotheses. Here P is the statistical probability
measure. The traders in the economy have the information set F and beliefs Pk assumed to
be equivalent to P. It is this information set that is relevant for the subsequent definition of
constrained informational efficiency.1
The financial market is assumed to consist of one risk-free asset and one risky asset.
Prices are given in units of the risk-free asset, so that, in particular, the risk-free asset has a
constant price equal to unity. The price at time t of the risky asset is denoted by St, and it
is assumed that S = (St)0≤t≤T is a strictly positive continuous semimartingale with respect
to the filtration F.
A (self-financing) trading strategy H is an S-integrable predictable process representing
the number of shares of the risky asset held at each point in time. It is called a-admissible
if (H · S)t ≥ −a for all t ∈ [0, T ], and admissible if it is a-admissible for some a ≥ 0. It is
called constrained if Ht ≥ 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ], i.e. if it satisfies a basic short sale restriction.
We define
A = {all admissible strategies H},
AC = {all constrained admissible strategies H}.
Note the slight abuse of terminology: in order to specify the trading strategy one also needs
the number H0t of shares held in the risk-free asset at each time t. However, since only
self-financing strategies are considered, the wealth process Xt = H
0
t +HtSt satisfies
Xt = x+ (H · S)t,
1This structure can be extended to allow differential information across traders analogous to that discussed
in [17], p. 11; see also [13] for related results. For simplicity of presentation, this extension is not discussed
further herein.
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where x = W0 is the initial capital. This relation determines H
0. Note that we do not
impose short sale restrictions on the risk-free asset (see Cuoco [7] for a setting where such
constraints are covered.)
2.1 No Arbitrage
Our primary interest is how short sale constraints affect no-arbitrage type restrictions in
equilibrium. We now review the various notions of no arbitrage.
Definition 2.1. We say that
• NA (NAC) holds if (H · S)T ≥ 0 implies (H · S)T = 0 for any H ∈ A (H ∈ AC);
• ND (NDC) holds if (H · S)T ≥ ST − S0 implies (H · S)T = ST − S0 for any H ∈ A
(H ∈ AC);
• NUPBR (NUPBRC) holds if the set K (KC) is bounded in L
0, where
K = {1 + (H · S)T : H is 1-admissible},
KC = {1 + (H · S)T : H is constrained 1-admissible};
• NFLVR (NFLVRC) holds if both NA and NUPBR (NAC and NUPBRC) hold.
Here NA stands for No Arbitrage, ND for No Dominance, NUPBR for No Unbounded
Profit with Bounded Risk, and NFLVR for No Free Lunch with Vanishing Risk. While NA is
an old concept in finance, NFLVR was introduced in Delbaen and Schachermayer[9] and then
in a more general setting in [10]. The condition NUPBR was studied in a general setting in
Karatzas and Kardaras [21]. The ND condition is perhaps less well-known, but was in fact
already introduced in Merton [30]. Its intuitive economic meaning is that it is impossible
to find a trading strategy which dominates buying and holding the risky asset itself. We
also note that by a well-known characterization result, see for instance [21, Proposition 4.2],
NFLVR (NFLVRC) as defined above is equivalent to the condition that there is no sequence
Hn ∈ A (Hn ∈ AC) such that fn = (H
n · S)T satisfies limn ‖max(−fn, 0)‖L∞ = 0 and
limn fn = f almost surely for some f ≥ 0 with P(f > 0) > 0.
The following notion plays in important role in the analysis of the ND condition, among
other things.
Definition 2.2. A strategy H ∈ A (H ∈ AC) is called maximal (C-maximal) if (K ·S)T ≥
(H · S)T implies (K · S)T = (H · S)T for any K ∈ A (K ∈ AC).
We can now phrase the ND condition as saying that holding a constant number of shares
in the risky asset is a maximal strategy. Similarly, the NA condition means that investing
all one’s wealth in the risk-free asset is a maximal strategy.
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2.2 Dual Characterizations
The various meanings of no arbitrage appearing in Definition 2.1 can be characterized in
terms of equivalent probability measures, or, more generally, deflator processes. In order to
state these results we introduce the following sets.
M = {Q ∼ P : S is a Q-martingale}
Mloc = {Q ∼ P : S is a local Q-martingale}
Msup = {Q ∼ P : S is a Q-supermartingale}
Dloc = {Y : Y is ca`dla`g adapted, Y ≥ 0, Y0 = 1, and Y (1 +H · S)is
a local martingale for every 1-admissible H}
Dsup = {Y : Y is ca`dla`g adapted, Y ≥ 0, Y0 = 1, and Y (1 +H · S)is
a supermartingale for every constrained 1-admissible H}.
The elements of M are called equivalent martingale measures. The elements of Mloc and
Msup are called equivalent local martingale (supermartingale) measures, respectively, whereas
the elements of Dloc (Dsup) are called local martingale (supermartingale) deflators. If we
identify a measure Q ∼ P with its Radon-Nikodym density process, we have the following
inclusions
M ⊂ Mloc ⊂ Msup ⊂ Dsup and M ⊂ Mloc ⊂ Dloc ⊂ Dsup.
The no arbitrage type conditions from Definition 2.1 have the following characterizations.
Theorem 2.1. The following assertions hold.
(i) NUPBR (NUPBRC) holds if and only if Dloc 6= ∅ (Dsup 6= ∅);
(ii) NFLVR (NFLVRC) holds if and only if Mloc 6= ∅ (Msup 6= ∅);
(iii) NFLVR and ND hold if and only if M 6= ∅.
Proof. Part (i) was proved in [21], Part (ii) in [9] (see [21] for the constrained case), and
Part (iii) in [17].
3 Informational Efficiency
We are interested in economies populated by agents who trade in the risky and risk-free
assets in order to maximize expected utility from terminal wealth. We assume that the risky
asset is available in unit net supply, while the risk-free asset is available in zero net supply.
The agents face short sale restrictions on the risky asset, and therefore solve optimization
problems of the form
u(x) = sup
H∈AC
E [U(x+ (H · S)T )] . (3.1)
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Here x > 0 is the initial wealth, and U : Ω× (0,∞)→ R is a stochastic utility function. By
this we mean that U is FT ⊗ B(R)-measurable, E[|U(x)|] < ∞ for all x > 0, and almost
surely, x 7→ U(x) is continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave, with
limx→∞ U(x) =∞. It also satisfies Inada conditions at zero and infinity: limx↓0 U
′(x) =∞,
limx→∞ U
′(x) = 0. Its domain of definition is extended to all of R by setting U(x) = −∞
for x ≤ 0. We use the convention that E[U(x + (H · S)T )] = −∞ whenever the negative
part of U(x + (H · S)T ) has infinite expectation, even if the positive part also has infinite
expectation.
The maximization problem (3.1) has an associated family of dual problems,
v(y) = sup
Y ∈Dsup
E [V (yYT ))] , (3.2)
where V (y) = supx>0(U(x)−xy) is the conjugate of U , and y > 0. There is a large literature
where existence and uniqueness of solutions to (3.1)–(3.2) is established, and the optimizers
characterized, under a variety of assumptions on U and S. Rather than committing to a
specific set of hypotheses, we will simply assume that our utility functions are sufficiently
well-behaved that the main conclusions of the duality theory of (3.1)–(3.2) are valid. The
main reasons for doing this are to avoid imposing artificial conditions on our utility functions,
and to help emphasize which properties are, in fact, important for the subsequent results.
Definition 3.1. We say that a stochastic utility function U is viable if, whenever the con-
ditions
Msup 6= ∅, u(x) ∈ Rfor some x > 0, v(y) ∈ Rfor some y > 0 (3.3)
hold, we have
(i) u and v are conjugate: v(y) = supx>0(u(x) − xy) and u(x) = infy>0(v(y) + xy).
Furthermore, they are continuously differentiable on (0,∞).
(ii) For each x > 0, the primal problem (3.1) has an optimal solution Ĥ ∈ AC. If H is
another optimal solution, then (H · S)T = (Ĥ · S)T .
(iii) For each y > 0, the dual problem (3.2) has a unique optimal solution Ŷ ∈ Dsup.
(iv) If x and y are related via y = u′(x), then the corresponding optimal solutions satisfy
x+ (Ĥ · S)T = I(yŶT ),
where I = (U ′)−1. Moreover, Ŷ (x+ Ĥ · S) is a martingale.
Conditions under which viability holds are available in the extensive literature on utility
maximization. For example, Karatzas and Zitkovic [23] give conditions that are applicable
to the current setting (and allow the condition on v in (3.3) to be dropped.) The seminal
paper in the unconstrained case is Kramkov anad Schachermayer [25], and a more general
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characterization of viability is given in Mostovy [31]. The latter paper suggests that in
general one should include the condition on v in (3.3).
Let us briefly remark on the possibility of having stochastic utility functions. This is
convenient for several reasons. First, it allows us to cover our assumption of heterogeneous
beliefs P∗ ∼ P (replace U(x) by ZU(x), where ZdP = dP∗.) Second, the initial discounting
of the prices is without loss of generality (replace U(x) by U(exp(
´ T
0
rtdt)x), where r is the
interest rate.) Third, the assumption that utility depends on final wealth can be replaced
by the assumption that utility arises from consuming, at time T , a good whose unit price is
ψ (replace U(x) by U(xψ).) Of course, the above statements all come with the caveat that
viability must be preserved under the respective modifications of the utilities.
We now consider our n agents, indexed by k = 1, . . . , n. Each agent is equipped with
a viable stochastic utility function Uk and some initial wealth xk > 0. In equilibrium, the
agent will follow some trading strategy Ĥk ∈ AC . We refer to (Uk, xk, Ĥ
k : k = 1, . . . , n) as
the constrained agent characteristics. We use the following standard notion of an economic
equilibrium.
Definition 3.2. A constrained equilibrium is a financial market S together with constrained
agent characteristics (Uk, xk, Ĥ
k : k = 1, . . . , n) such that
(i) individual optimality holds: For each k, Ĥk is an optimal solution to (3.1) with U = Uk
and x = xk, whose optimal value is finite. It is also required that the dual value function
is finite for some y;
(ii) markets clear: Ĥ1t + · · ·+ Ĥ
n
t = 1 for all t ∈ [0, T ] and x1 + · · ·+ xn = S0.
The aggregate wealth in the economy at time zero is S0, since the risky asset is in unit
net supply with initial price S0, and the risk-free asset is in zero net supply. This explains
the form of the market clearing condition for the initial wealth levels.
Note also that the market clearing condition (ii) automatically implies that market clear-
ing holds for the risk-free asset. Indeed, the holdings of investor k in the risk-free asset is
Ĥ0,kt = xk + (Ĥ
k · S)t − Ĥ
k
t St by the self-financing property. Therefore,∑
k Ĥ
0,k
t =
∑
k xk + (1 · S)t − St = S0 + St − S0 − St = 0.
We can now introduce the notion of constrained informational efficiency. It generalizes
the notion of informational efficiency discussed in [17] to the case where short sale restrictions
are present.
Definition 3.3. A financial market S is called constrained informationally efficient if it sup-
ported by some constrained equilibrium, that is, if there exist constrained agent characteristics
(Uk, xk, Ĥ
k : k = 1, . . . , n) which together with S form a constrained equilibrium.
Our aim is now to generate necessary conditions for constrained informational efficiency.
Sufficient conditions will be investigated in Section 4, where the stronger property of the
existence of a representative agent plays a key role.
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Lemma 3.1. Assume that for some x > 0 the maximization problem (3.1) has an optimal
solution Ĥ with finite optimal value. Then
(i) Ĥ is C-maximal;
(ii) NFLVRC holds.
Proof. (i): Let K be a constrained admissible strategy with ∆ := (K · S)T − (Ĥ · S)T ≥ 0.
Since Ĥ gives finite utility and since Uk strictly increasing, K would yield a strict improve-
ment if P(∆ > 0) > 0. Hence ∆ = 0, and Ĥ is C-maximal.
(ii): We need to establish NAC and L
0-boundedness of the set KC in Definition 2.1.
The argument is well-known. First, suppose K is a constrained admissible strategy with
(K · S)T ≥ 0. Then Ĥ + K is also constrained admissible, and we have ((Ĥ +K) · S)T ≥
(Ĥ · S)T . But Ĥ is C-maximal by Part (i), so this inequality must be an equality. Hence
(K · S)T = 0, and we deduce NAC . To prove that KC is bounded in L
0, we adapt [21,
Proposition 4.19] to the case with stochastic utility functions. Assume for contradiction that
KC is not bounded in L
0. Then we can find ε > 0 and constrained 1-admissible strategies
Hn, n ∈ N, such that P(1 + (Hn · S)T > n) > ε. Thus,
u(ε+ 1) ≥ E [U(ε+ 1 + (Hn · S)T )] ≥ −E [|U(ε)|] +
[
U(ε+ 1 + n)1{1+(Hn·S)T>n}
]
.
Since U(ε + 1 + n)→∞ almost surely, we can find, for any m > 0, some large n such that
P(U(ε+ 1 + n) > m) > 1− ε/2. Then,
U(ε+ 1 + n)1{1+(Hn·S)T>n} ≥ m1{1+(Hn·S)T>n and U(ε+1+n)>m} − |U(ε)|,
so that
u(ε+ 1) ≥ −2E [|U(ε)|] +mP (1 + (Hn · S)T > n and U(ε+ 1 + n) > m)
≥ −2E [|U(ε)|] +m
ε
2
.
It follows that u(ε+ 1) =∞, which by concavity of u implies u(x) =∞. This is the desired
contradiction.
We are now ready to give our first main result, which states that in a constrained equi-
librium there is in fact a local martingale deflator. A priori one would only expect a su-
permartingale deflator to exist. However, market clearing implies that at every point in
time, there must be some investor who optimally holds a positive number of shares in the
risky asset. Such an investor is locally unconstrained, and this forces the price to behave, in
a qualitative way, as it would in an unconstrained economy—otherwise the investor would
reduce his holdings, contradicting optimality.
Theorem 3.1. Let (S; Uk, xk, Ĥ
k : k = 1, . . . , n) be a constrained equilibrium. Then Dloc is
non-empty.
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It is a striking fact that the above heuristic motivation for Theorem 3.1 fails if we are
interested in the NA property rather than the NUPBR property. Indeed, in Section 5.2 we
provide an example where both NFLVRC and NUPBR hold, NA fails, and a strictly positive
strategy Ĥ (in fact, the constant strategy Ĥ ≡ 1) is optimal for (3.1). In other words, even
though the optimal strategy is strictly positive, the short sale constraint is binding in the
sense that an unconstrained agent would choose a very different strategy.
An immediate consequence of Theorem 3.1 and Lemma 3.1(ii) is the following.
Corollary 1. A constrained informationally efficient market S necessarily satisfies both
NFLVRC and NUPBR.
The proof of Theorem 3.1 relies on the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2. Let U be a viable stochastic utility function. Suppose (3.3) holds, and let Ŷ be
the optimal solution to the dual problem (3.2) for some y > 0. Then Ŷ is a strictly positive
local martingale.
Proof. The Inada conditions imply I(0) = ∞, which forces ŶT > 0 due to (iv) in the
definition of viability. Since Ŷ is a nonnegative supermartingale this yields Ŷ > 0, proving
the first assertion. As a consequence (and since Ŷ0 = 1), there is a local martingale N
and a nondecreasing predictable process B such that Ŷ = E (−N − B). We need to prove
that B = 0. To this end, observe that since S > 0 there is a continuous semimartingale
M + A, with M a local martingale and A a predictable finite variation process, such that
S = S0E (M+A). Furthermore, for any nonnegative predictable (M+A)-integrable process θ,
X = E (θ·(M+A)) is the wealth process of the constrained 1-admissible strategyH = S−1θX .
Indeed, we have H ≥ 0, X > 0, and
X = 1 +X · (θ · (M + A)) = 1 + (XθS−1) · (S · (M + A)) = 1 +H · S.
Since Ŷ ∈ Dsup, therefore, Ŷ X is a supermartingale. Moreover, Yor’s formula and the fact
that [M,B] = [A,B] = [A,N ] = 0 due to the continuity of M and A, yield
Ŷ X = E (−N − B)E (θ · (M + A)) = E (−N + θ ·M + θ · (A− [N,M ])− B).
It follows that θ · (A − [N,M ]) − B is a non-increasing process for any θ ≥ 0, and thus
A− [N,M ] must also be non-increasing. We claim that this implies that Y ′ = E (−N) lies in
Dsup. To see why, note that for any constrained 1-admissible H we have, with X = 1+H ·S,
Y ′X = 1 + Y ′− ·X +X · Y
′ + [Y ′, X ]
= 1 + (Y ′−HS) · (M + A) +X · Y
′ − (Y ′−HS) · [N,M ]
= 1 + (Y ′−HS) ·M +X · Y
′ + (Y ′−HS) · (A− [N,M ]).
Only the last term is not a local martingale, and it is non-increasing since Y ′−HS ≥ 0 and
A− [N,M ] is non-increasing. So Y ′ ∈ Dsup as claimed. But we also have
ŶT = E (−N −B)T ≤ E (−N)T = Y
′
T ,
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with strict inequality on the set {BT > 0}. If this set had positive probability, Y
′ would
achieve a strictly smaller objective value than Ŷ in the dual problem (3.2), contradicting the
optimality of Ŷ . Hence BT = 0, and the lemma is proved.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let Ŷ k be the dual optimizer of the k:th investor’s problem. By
Lemma 3.2 it is a strictly positive local martingale, and condition (iv) in the definition of
viability implies that Ŷ k(xk + Ĥ
k · S) is a martingale. In particular we may write Ŷ k =
E (−Nk) for some local martingale Nk. Letting S =M +A be the canonical decomposition
of S, integration by parts yields
Ŷ k(xk + Ĥ
k · S) = xk + (xk + Ĥ
k · S) · Ŷ k− + (Ŷ
kĤk) · (M + A) + Ĥk · [Ŷ k,M ]
= xk + (xk + Ĥ
k · S) · Ŷ k− + (Ŷ
k
−Ĥ
k) ·M + (ĤkŶ k−) · (A− [N
k,M ]).
Since the left side is a P-martingale, and since Ŷ k > 0, we deduce Ĥk · (A − [Nk,M ]) = 0,
and hence
1{Ĥk>0} · (A− [N
k,M ]) = 0. (3.4)
We now define predictable sets Dk by
D1 = {Ĥ
1 > 0}, Dk = {Ĥ
k > 0} \Dk−1, k = 2, . . . , n.
Then clearly Dk ∩Dℓ = ∅ whenever k 6= ℓ. Moreover, market clearing implies that for every
(t, ω), there is at least one k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that Ĥkt (ω) > 0. Therefore ∪kDk = ∪k{Ĥ
k >
0} = [0, T ]× Ω, and hence
1D1 + · · ·+ 1Dn = 1.
Finally, since Dk ⊂ {Ĥ
k > 0}, it follows from (3.4) that 1Dk · (A− [N
k,M ]) = 0 for each k.
Thus with
N = 1D1 ·N
1 + · · ·1Dn ·N
n,
we get
A− [N,M ] =
n∑
k=1
1Dk · (A− [N
k,M ]) = 0.
Setting Y = E (−N) this yields Y S = S · Y + Y ·M , which is a local martingale. Thus
Y ∈ Dloc, and the theorem is proved.
4 Representative Agent Equilibria
In this section we consider financial markets that are not only informationally efficient in
the sense of Definition 3.3, but have the additional feature that a representative agent can
be constructed. Such markets turn out to have a simple dual characterization in terms
of supermartingale measures and local martingale deflators, see Theorem 4.1 below. We
also consider the question of aggregation of a multi-agent equilibrium to a representative
agent equilibrium. This issue has a long history in the literature, see for instance Magill[29],
Constantinides [6], Karatzas, Lehoczky, and Shreve [22], Cuoco and He [8].
11
Definition 4.1. A constrained representative agent equilibrium (S;U) is a constrained equi-
librium with one single agent. That is, the constrained agent characteristics is (U, 1, 1).
By market clearing, a representative agent in any equilibrium (constrained or not) must
use the constant strategy Ĥ ≡ 1. This strategy automatically lies in AC , clearly satisfying the
short sale constraint. However, there exist constrained representative agent equilibria, where
the constant strategy is optimal in the class AC , but not in the class A of unconstrained
admissible strategies. An example is given in Section 5.2.
The following is the main result of this section.
Theorem 4.1. Consider a financial market S. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) (S, U) is a constrained representative agent equilibrium for some viable stochastic utility
function U ,
(ii) Msup 6= ∅ and there exists a process Z ∈ Dloc such that ZS is a martingale.
In either case, S satisfies NFLVRC, NDC, and NUPBR.
An immediate consequence of this theorem and the definition of constrained informational
efficiency is the following.
Corollary 2. If Msup 6= ∅ and there exists a process Z ∈ Dloc such that ZS is a martingale,
then the market is constrained informationally efficient.
The following lemma is used in the proof of Theorem 4.1. It essentially shows that
viability is invariant under changes of beliefs. See Ka¨llblad [20, Theorem 1] for a related
result.
Lemma 4.1. Let U∗ be a viable stochastic utility function, and P∗ ∼ P an equivalent prob-
ability measure. Set Zt =
dP∗
dP
|Ft. Then the stochastic utility function U = ZTU
∗ is again
viable.
Proof. Since the class AC is invariant under equivalent changes of probability measure, we
have
u(x) = sup
H∈AC
E[U(x+ (H · S)T )] = sup
H∈AC
E∗[U∗(x+ (H · S)T )], (4.1)
where E∗[ · ] denotes expectation under P∗. Furthermore, we have
V (y) = sup
x>0
(U(x)− xy) = ZT sup
x>0
(
U∗(x)− x
y
ZT
)
= ZTV
∗
(
y
ZT
)
,
where V ∗ is the conjugate of U∗. Therefore,
v(y) = inf
Y ∈Dsup
E
[
ZTV
∗
(
yYT
ZT
)]
= inf
Y ∗∈D∗sup
E∗ [V ∗ (yY ∗T )] , (4.2)
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where D∗sup = {Y/Z : Y ∈ Dsup}. Note that this is the set of all ca`dla`g adapted Y
∗ with
Y ∗ ≥ 0 and Y ∗0 = 1 such that Y
∗(1 + H · S) is a P∗-supermartingale for every constrained
1-admissible H . Suppose now (3.3) holds, and note that this condition is invariant under
equivalent changes of measure. In view of (4.1) and (4.2), the viability of U∗ implies that
u and v are conjugate and continuously differentiable. Moreover, the primal problem has
an optimal solution Ĥ ∈ AC , and the dual problem an optimal solution Ŷ
∗ ∈ D∗sup. Both
are unique in the appropriate sense, see Definition 3.1(ii)–(iii). The process Ŷ = ZŶ ∗ then
lies in Dsup and is optimal for the dual problem under P. At this point we have established
properties (i)–(iii) in the definition of viability. Property (iv) follows from the equality
x+ (Ĥ · S)T = I
∗(yY ∗T ) = I(yZTY
∗
T ) = I(yYT )
and the fact that Ŷ (x+Ĥ ·S) is a P-martingale if and only if Ŷ ∗(x+Ĥ ·S) is a P∗-martingale.
The lemma is proved.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. (i) =⇒ (ii): Lemma 3.1 implies that NFLVRC holds, so that Msup 6= ∅
by Theorem 2.1. Market clearing together with viability of U show that the dual optimizer
Z = Ŷ has the property that ZS is a martingale. Moreover, Z is a local martingale by
Lemma 3.2. This implies that Y ∈ Dloc. Indeed, let H ∈ AC be 1-admissible. Integration
by parts applied twice (and associativity of the stochastic integral) yields
Z(1 +H · S) = 1 + (1 +H · S) · Z + Z− · (H · S) +H · [Z, S]
= 1 + (1 +H · S −HS) · Z +H · (ZS).
Thus the left side is a stochastic integral with respect to the (two-dimensional) local mar-
tingale (Z,ZS). Since it is nonnegative it is again a local martingale by the Ansel-Stricker
theorem.
(ii) =⇒ (i): The proof is inspired by [17, Theorem 3.2]. As a candidate utility function
for the representative agent we take
U(x) =
ZTS
γ
Tx
1−γ
1− γ
for some γ ∈ (0, 1). Let us show that Ĥ ≡ 1 is optimal. Clearly Ĥ ∈ AC . Next, the
corresponding utility is E[U(ST )] = E[ZTST ]/(1 − γ) = 1/(1 − γ), in particular it is finite.
Now let H ∈ AC be arbitrary. We may assume that the final wealth 1 + (H · S)T is positive
almost surely, otherwise the utility would be −∞. This implies that the wealth process is in
fact 1-admissible. Indeed, H · S is a supermartingale under any Q ∈ Msup, which exists by
assumption, so
1 + (H · S)t ≥ E
Q[1 + (H · S)T | Ft] > 0. (4.3)
Here we used [34, Proposition 3.5], the “Ansel-Stricker theorem for supermartingales”. It is
now easy to see that Ĥ is optimal. Indeed, concavity of U , the equality U ′(ST ) = ZT , and
the properties of Z yield
E[U(1 + (H · S)T )] ≤ E[U(ST )] + E[U
′(ST )(1 + (H · S)T )]− E[U
′(ST )ST ]
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= E[U(ST )] + E[ZT (1 + (H · S)T )]− E[ZTST ]
≤ E[U(ST )].
We need to prove that U is viable. To this end, write U(x) = dP
∗
dP
U∗(x), where
dP∗
dP
=
ZTS
γ
T
E[ZTS
γ
T ]
, U∗(x) = E[ZTS
γ
T ]
x1−γ
1− γ
.
Note that E[ZTS
γ
T ] ≤ E[ZT (1 + ST )] < ∞. The utility function U
∗ is viable by [23, Theo-
rem 3.10], so Lemma 4.1 implies that U is also viable.
It now only remains to prove that one (and hence both) of (i) and (ii) implies NFLVRC ,
NDC , and NUPBRC . In view of what we have already done, only NDC needs to be verified.
But this follows directly from Lemma 3.1(i).
In the complete market setting one expects that a representative agent equilibrium can
be found. The following result confirms this intuition.
Proposition 4.1. Let (S; Uk, xk, Ĥ
k : k = 1, . . . , n) be a constrained equilibrium. If Dloc is
a singleton, and Ĥk > 0 for all k, then the two equivalent conditions of Theorem 4.1 hold.
Proof. Let Ŷ k be the dual optimizers for the agents’ optimization problems. By Lemma 3.2
there exist local martingales Nk such that Ŷ k = E (−Nk). Let S = M +A be the canonical
decomposition of S. Integration by parts yields
Ŷ k(xk + Ĥ
k · S) = (xk + Ĥ
k · S) · Ŷ k + Ŷ k−Ĥ
k · (M + A− [Nk,M ]).
Since Ŷ k(xk + Ĥ
k · S) is a martingale, and since Ŷ k−Ĥ
k > 0, we get A = [Nk,M ]. Another
application of the integration by parts formula shows that Ŷ kS is a local martingale, so we
deduce Ŷ k ∈ Dloc = {Z} and hence Ŷ
k = Z for all k. Market clearing gives
ZS = Z
n∑
k=1
(xk + Ĥ
k · S) =
n∑
k=1
Ŷ k(xk + Ĥ
k · S),
which is a (true) martingale. Since also Msup 6= ∅ by Lemma 3.1, condition (ii) of Theo-
rem 4.1 is satisfied.
Theorem 4.1 characterizes those price processes S for which a supporting representative
agent equilibrium exists. However, the choice of representative agent utility U is far from
unique in general, and it is natural to ask if some choices are more natural (or useful) than
others. In particular, if the price process S is known to come from a constrained equilibrium
(S; Uk, xk, Ĥ
k : k = 1, . . . , n), it is of interest to know whether U1, . . . , Un can be aggregated
to form a representative utility U . This was first done in Negishi [32] in the complete market
case, see also Magill[29], Constantinides [6], Karatzas, Lehoczky, and Shreve [22], and in
Cuoco and He [8] for incomplete markets. Extensions involving investment constraints have
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been considered in Basak and Cuoco [2] and Hugonnier [16]. Specifically, one considers
functions
U(x;λ) = max
c1+···+cn=x
n∑
k=1
λkUk(ck), (4.4)
for weight vectors λ = (λ1, . . . , λn) ∈ R
n
++, possibly stochastic, and asks for a weight vector
such that the constant strategy is optimal for U( · ;λ) given the prevailing price process S.
In this case we call U( · ;λ) an aggregate utility function.
Theorem 4.2. Let (S; Uk, xk, Ĥ
k : k = 1, . . . , n) be a constrained equilibrium supporting
a representative agent—that is, S satisfies one of the equivalent conditions in Theorem 4.1.
Then there are stochastic weights λ = (λ1, . . . , λn) such that U( · ;λ) is an aggregate utility
function.
Proof. Fix any weights λ = (λ1, . . . , λn) and any x > 0. The Lagrangian corresponding to
the optimization problem in (4.4) is
L(c1, . . . , cn;µ) =
n∑
k=1
λkUk(ck) + µ
(
x−
n∑
k=1
ck
)
,
where µ ∈ R is the Lagrange multiplier. By strict concavity, the maximizer (c∗1, . . . , c
∗
n) and
associated Lagrange multiplier µ∗ are characterized by the first order conditions, namely
x = c∗1 + · · ·+ c
∗
n, λkU
′
k(c
∗
k)− µ
∗ = 0 (k = 1, . . . , n). (4.5)
Now, let Z ∈ Dloc be such that ZS is a martingale—such Z exists by hypothesis. Moreover,
let X̂kT = xk + (Ĥ
k · S)T be the final wealth of agent k, and set
λk =
ZT
U ′k(X̂
k
T )
, k = 1, . . . , n.
Since also X̂1T + · · ·+ X̂
n
T = ST holds by market clearing, (4.5) is satisfed with c
∗
k = X̂
k
T and
µ∗ = ZT . Hence
U(ST ;λ) = λ1U1(X̂
1
T ) + · · ·+ λnUn(X̂
n
T ). (4.6)
Consider an arbitrary H ∈ AC with strictly positive final value XT = 1 + (H · S)T . Then,
for some X1T , . . . , X
n
T with X
1
T + · · ·+X
n
T = XT , we have
U(XT ;λ) = λ1U1(X
1
T ) + · · ·+ λnUn(X
n
T )
≤
n∑
k=1
[
λkUk(X̂
k
T ) + λkU
′
k(X̂
k
T )(X
k
T − X̂
k
T )
]
= U(ST ;λ) +
n∑
k=1
λkU
′
k(X̂
k
T )(X
k
T − X̂
k
T )
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= U(ST ;λ) + ZT (XT − ST ),
where we used the concavity of Uk, the identity (4.6), as well the fact that ZT = λkU
′
k(X̂
k
T )
for all k. Using thatX is strictly positive by NFLVRC (see (4.3) in the proof of Theorem 4.1),
so that ZX is a positive local martingale and thus a supermartingale, we get
E[U(XT ;λ)] ≤ E[U(ST ;λ)] + E[ZT (XT − ST )] ≤ E[U(ST ;λ)].
Thus the constant strategy is optimal for U( · ;λ), which is what we had to prove.
5 Examples
In this section we provide examples illustrating to what extent our previous results are
sharp. The examples are based on Proposition 5.1 below, which is also interesting in its
own right. We work on the canonical path space (Ω,F ,F,P), where the coordinate process
W is Brownian motion under P, and F is its natural filtration. Some care is needed in the
description of Ω: it is the set of all functions ω : R+ → R ∪ {∞} that are continuous on
[0, ζ(ω)), where ζ(ω) = inf{t ≥ 0 : ω(t) = ∞}, and satisfy ω(t) = ∞ for all t ≥ ζ(ω).
Moreover, the filtration F is not augmented with the P-nullsets, and this does not affect the
stochastic calculus used below.
By means of a construction due to Fo¨llmer [12], in turn inspired by Doob’s h-transform,
any strictly positive local martingale Z with Z0 = 1 can be viewed as the density process of
some probability measure, possibly not equivalent with respect to P. Specifically, define its
explosion time by
σ = lim
n
σn, σn = inf {t ≥ 0 : Zt ≥ n} ,
which of course satisfies P(σ < ∞) = 0. Then there exists a probability measure P∗ on F
with P|Ft ≪ P
∗|Ft for each t ≥ 0, such that
dP
dP∗
∣∣∣∣
Ft
=
1
Zt
1{t<σ},
and the equality E [Zt] = P
∗(σ > t) holds for each t ≥ 0. In particular, Z is a true
martingale under P if and only if P∗(σ = ∞) = 1. We refer to P∗ as the Fo¨llmer measure
corresponding to Z. The Fo¨llmer measure is uniquely determined on Fσ, but may have
several different extensions to F . This possible non-uniqueness plays a key role in Larsson[27]
and is also discussed in Perkowski and Ruf [33]. For us the particular choice of extension is
not important.
Girsanov’s theorem also extends to this setting. We will only need the following simple
version. If the local martingale Z is of the form Z = E (θ · W ) for some predictable W -
integrable process θ, there is a P∗-Brownian motion W ∗, possibly defined on an extension of
the original probability space, such that
W ∗t =Wt −
ˆ t
0
θsds, t < σ. (5.1)
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Indeed, Girsanov’s theorem shows that W ∗t∧σn is stopped Brownian motion under the equiv-
alent measure Pn with density process Zt∧σn (this coincides with P
∗ on Fσn), so W
∗
t is
well-defined on [[0, σ[[. Using that 〈W ∗,W ∗〉t = t, one shows that limt↑σW
∗
t exists P
∗-a.s. on
{σ < ∞}. Thus, letting W ∗∗ be an independent Brownian motion (this is where we may
have to extend the probability space), the process W ∗1[[0,σ[[ + (W
∗∗
t −W
∗∗
σ +W
∗
σ )1[[σ,∞[[ is
Brownian motion under P∗ and satisfies (5.1). For further details regarding the construction
of the Fo¨llmer measure and Girsanov’s theorem, see Yoeurp[37].
The following proposition is the basis for our examples below. It is inspired by examples
by Kazamaki, see [24, Chapter 1.4]. To state the result, define
p(T ) = P
(
inf
0≤t≤T
Wt ≤ −1
)
,
the probability that standard Brownian motion hits −1 before time T .
Proposition 5.1. Fix T > 0 and a constant β > 1. Let X be the unique strong solution to
dXt = −X
2
t dWt, X0 = 1,
and define a process L and stopping time τ by
L =
E (−βX ·W )
E (−X ·W )
and τ = inf
{
t ≥ 0 : Lt ≥ 1 + p(T )
−1
}
.
Then the local martingales Z(1) = E (−X1[[0,τ ]] · W ) and Z
(β) = E (−βX1[[0,τ ]] · W ) satisfy
E[Z
(1)
T ] < 1 and E[Z
(β)
T ] = 1.
The idea of the construction is best understood by passing to the Fo¨llmer measures P(1)
and P(β) corresponding to Z(1) and Z(β), respectively. It is not hard to see that if τ were
always infinite, both these density processes would explode under their respective Fo¨llmer
measure, and would thus both be strict local martingales under P. Of course τ is not always
infinite—in fact, it is designed to occur early enough to P(β)-almost surely prevent Z(β) from
exploding, while at the same time occurring late enough that Z(1) does explode with positive
P(1)-probability. The device for achieving this is the “likelihood ratio” process L (note that
we have Lt = Z
(β)
t /Z
(1)
t for t < τ .) It turns out that L is a supermartingale under P
(1),
and hence fails to trigger τ with positive probability, but is an exploding submartingale
under P(β) (or, more precisely, would have exploded without the intervention of the stopping
time τ .) We now turn to the details.
Proof. We first prove E[Z
(1)
T ] < 1. Let P
(1) be the Fo¨llmer measure associated with Z(1), and
let W (1) be a P(1)-Brownian motion such that
W
(1)
t =Wt +
ˆ t
0
Xs1{s<τ}ds, t < σ
(1),
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where σ(1) is the explosion time of Z(1). A calculation yields, for all t < σ(1), the equalities
Xt∧τ = E (−X ·W )t∧τ = Z
(1)
t and
1
Xt∧τ
= 1 +Wt∧τ +
´ t∧τ
0
Xsds = 1 +W
(1)
t∧τ . This implies
1− E[Z(1)T ] = P
(1)(σ(1) ≤ T )
≥ P(1)(1 +W (1) hits zero before T )− P(1)(τ ≤ T )
= p(T )− P(1)(τ ≤ T ).
It suffices to show that the right side is strictly positive. To this end, we compute, for
t < σ(1),
Lt = exp
(
−(β − 1)
ˆ t
0
XsdWs −
1
2
ˆ t
0
(β2 − 1)X2sds
)
= exp
(
−(β − 1)
ˆ t
0
XsdW
(1)
s −
1
2
ˆ t
0
[
(β2 − 1)X2s − 2(β − 1)X
2
s1{s<τ}
]
ds
)
= exp
(
−(β − 1)
ˆ t
0
XsdW
(1)
s −
1
2
ˆ t
0
(β − 1)2X2sds−
ˆ t
t∧τ
(β − 1)X2sds
)
= E
(
−(β − 1)X ·W (1)
)
t
exp
(
−(β − 1)
ˆ t
t∧τ
X2sds
)
.
Thus L is a supermartingale under P(1), which implies
P(1)(τ <∞) = P(1)
(
sup
t≥0
Lt ≥ 1 + p(T )
−1
)
≤ (1 + p(T )−1)−1 < p(T ),
by Doob’s inequality. This proves E[Z
(1)
T ] < 1.
We now establish E[Z
(β)
T ] = 1. Similarly as before, let P
(β) be the Fo¨llmer measure
associated with Z(β), and let W (β) be a P(β)-Brownian motion such that
W
(β)
t = Wt +
ˆ t
0
βXs1{s<τ}ds, t < σ
(β)
holds, where σ(β) is the explosion time of Z(β). We then have
1
Z
(β)
t
= E
(
βX ·W (β)
)
t∧τ
, t < σ(β),
which implies P(β)(τ < σ(β) <∞) = 0 since Z(β) does not move after τ . It also implies that
σ(β) can be written
σ(β) = lim
n→∞
inf
{
t ≥ 0 :
ˆ t∧τ
0
X2sds ≥ n
}
.
On the other hand, a calculation similar to the one in the first part of the proof yields
1
Lt∧τ
= E
(
(β − 1)X ·W (β)
)
t∧τ
, t < σ(β),
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Hence on the event {σ(β) < τ}, we have limt↑σ(β) Lt = ∞ (up to a P
(β)-nullset). But this is
impossible since, by definition of τ , Lt cannot reach above 1 + p(T )
−1 prior to τ . It follows
that P(β)(σ(β) < τ) = 0, and consequently
P(β)(σ(β) <∞) = 0.
The proposition is proved.
5.1 Example 1
Using Proposition 5.1 we can immediately construct an example of a price process S with
nonnegative drift, which satisfies both NFLVRC and NUPBR, but not NA, on the time
interval [0, T ]. In other words, we have both an equivalent supermartingale measure and
a local martingale deflator, but no local martingale measure (and certainly no martingale
measure.) Indeed, in the notation of Proposition 5.1, set
S =
1
Z(1)
.
Then
dSt
St
= Xt1{t≤τ}dWt +X
2
t 1{t≤τ}dt,
so that S is strictly positive with positive drift. The only candidate density process is Z(1),
which is a local martingale deflator but fails to be a true martingale. Hence Dloc 6= ∅ but
Mloc = ∅. On the other hand, Z
(β) is a true martingale and thus induces a measure P(β)
that is equivalent to P on FT . Since
dSt
St
= Xt1{t≤τ}dW
(β)
t − (β − 1)X
2
t 1{t≤τ}dt,
it follows that S is a supermartingale under P(β), which thus lies in Msup.
Note that Z(1) ∈ Dloc has the property that Z
(1)S = 1 is a true martingale. Hence
by Theorem 4.1 the price process S is supported by some constrained representative agent
equilibrium, and NDC holds.
5.2 Example 2
In Theorem 4.1, the representative agent has stochastic utility in general. We now modify
the previous example slightly to get a price process S satisfying NFLVRC and NUPBR,
but not NA, with the property that the constant strategy Ĥ ≡ 1 is optimal for an agent
with logarithmic utility U(x) = log x. In other words, in equilibrium the investor does not
short the risky asset. This log-utility agent is therefore a valid representative agent for an
equilibrium supporting the price process S. The key for this is to make the drift of S strictly
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positive for all t ∈ [0, T ], not just prior to τ .2 We define the candidate local martingale
deflator by
Z = E
(
−(X1[[0,τ ]] + 1]]τ,T ]]) ·W
)
,
where X solves dXt = −X
2
t dWt. The candidate density process for an equivalent super-
martingale measure is given by
Zsup = E
(
−(βX1[[0,τ ]] + 1]]τ,T ]]) ·W
)
for some β > 1. Finally, the price process is defined by
S =
1
Z
.
Lemma 5.1. The process Z is a strict local martingale, and Zsup is a true martingale.
Proof. We would like to apply Proposition 5.1, and for this we first change probability
measure to P˜ given by dP˜ = Z˜TdP, where Z˜ = E (1]]τ,T ]] ·W ) is a true martingale by Novikov’s
condition. The process dW˜t = dWt − 1]]τ,T ]](t)dt is then Brownian motion under P˜. Define
X˜ as the solution to dX˜t = −X˜
2
t dW˜t, let L˜t = E (−βX˜ · W˜ )/E (−X˜ · W˜ ), and consider the
stopping time τ˜ = inf{t ≥ 0 : L˜t ≥ 1 + p(T )
−1}. Then, with
Z˜(1) = E
(
−X˜1[[0,τ˜ ]] · W˜
)
and Z˜(β) = E
(
−βX˜1[[0,τ˜ ]] · W˜
)
,
Proposition 5.1 shows that Z˜(1) is strict local martingale and Z˜(β) is a true martingale. This
carries over to Z˜Z˜(1) and Z˜Z˜(β), respectively. Now, by pathwise uniqueness of the defining
SDE for X˜ and X , together with the fact that W˜t = Wt for t < τ , it follows that X˜t = Xt
for t < τ . Hence, for t < τ , we have L˜t = Lt and thus τ˜ = τ . Consequently, Z˜Z˜
(1) = Z and
Z˜Z˜(β) = Zsup, and this proves the lemma.
As in the previous example it is now straightforward to verify that S has strictly positive
drift, Dloc = {Z}, Z
sup ∈ Dsup, and that Mloc = ∅ since Z is not a true martingale. It thus
remains to show that the constant strategy Ĥ ≡ 1 is optimal under logarithmic utility. But
this follows directly from the definition of S, Jensen’s inequality, and the fact that Z is a local
martingale deflator. Indeed, if H is any 1-admissible strategy and setting XT = 1+(H ·S)T ,
we have
E[logXT − log ST ] = E[log(ZTXT )] ≤ log(E[ZTXT ]) ≤ 0.
Note that the nonnegativity of H was not used. This means that Ĥ is optimal also among
unconstrained, 1-admissible strategies. However, since NA fails, it is not optimal among
all admissible strategies. In this sense, the short sale constraint is binding, because an
2Indeed, if S is a supermartingale on ]]τ, T ]], then E[logST ] = E[log(ST /ST∧τ )]+E[log ST∧τ ] ≤ E[log ST∧τ ],
where Jensen’s inequality and the assumption E[ST | FT∧τ ] ≤ ST∧τ were used. Hence it is always better
to stop trading at τ . Economically this is because a risk-averse agent will not take on the risk inherent in
holding S, without being compensated by positive returns in excess of the risk-free rate.
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unconstrained agent with access to any admissible strategy could produce arbitrage and
therefore (dramatically) improve upon Ĥ. Any such strategy would involve short positions.
On the other hand, since the optimal strategy Ĥ is strictly positive, it is tempting to think
that the short sale constraint is not binding. As the above shows, this interpretation is
misleading.
Another way of saying the same thing is the following: naively one may conjecture that a
strictly positive strategy could be improved upon without violating the short sale constraint
by adding “a little bit” of an (unconstrained) arbitrage strategy. This would imply that NA
is incompatible with strictly positive optimal strategies. Of course the above shows that
this is not the case—but what is interesting to note is that the analogous naive argument is
correct for NUPBR; this (together with market clearing) is what drives Theorem 3.1.
This discussion suggests that optimal strategies need not change in a continuous way
with respect to changes in investment constraints. Further investigation of this phenomenon
is left for future research.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have considered constrained informational efficiency of a financial market.
That is, we study conditions under which a given price process can be viewed as the outcome
of some equilibrium where agents are not allowed to short the risky asset. We find, some-
what surprisingly, that constrained informational efficiency implies the existence of a local
martingale deflator. The explanation for this result resides with the role of market clearing:
at any point in time, at least one agent is locally unconstrained. However, this intuition does
not carry over to arbitrage opportunities—indeed, we give an example of an equilibrium with
a single representative agent with logarithmic utility, optimally holds the full supply of the
risky asset, but where arbitrage is nonetheless possible using unconstrained strategies. Less
surprisingly, NFLVRC necessarily holds in equilibrium, and NDC holds whenever a represen-
tative agent equilibrium exists. The existence of such an equilibrium is fully characterized:
we show that a constrained representative agent equilibrium exists if and only if NFLVRC
holds and there is a local martingale deflator turning the price process into a true martin-
gale. Moreover, in a multi-agent complete market equilibrium, these conditions are satisfied
whenever all agents have strictly positive holdings in the risky asset.
The above shows that the inclusion of short sale constraints, arguably a fairly modest
modification of the fully frictionless framework, yields a surprisingly rich set of phenomena.
Nonetheless, much remains to be done. In the future it would be interesting to investigate
more general trading constraints, multiple assets, and price processes with jumps. We end by
listing some open questions that naturally arose from the analysis presented in the present
paper. It would be enlightening to see these issues resolved.
(i) If H,K are two C-maximal strategies, is the sum H+K again C-maximal? Since each
investor strategy Ĥk is C-maximal in equilibrium by Lemma 3.1, an affirmative answer
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to this question would imply that Ĥ1+ · · ·+ Ĥn = 1 is again C-maximal, so that NDC
always holds in equilibrium.
(ii) Is there a constrained informationally efficient market that is not consistent with any
constrained representative agent equilibrium? Equivalently (see Theorem 4.1), does
there exist a constrained equilibrium (S; Uk, xk, Ĥ
k : k = 1, . . . , n) such that ZS is a
strict local martingale for every Z ∈ Dloc?
(iii) If ZS is a true martingale for some Z ∈ Dloc, then NDC is satisfied. Does the converse
hold? If not, is there a different dual characterization of NDC?
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